Electromagnetic spectrum operations explained: EMSO, JEMSO, and EMBM
How DoD runs electromagnetic spectrum operations: JP 3-85, the EMS superiority strategy, JEMSO cells, EMBM, service EW units, and GAO's...
Electromagnetic warfare and spectrum technology move faster than the traditional acquisition system was built to handle. A jammer that defeats a commercial drone link this year may be useless next year. A receiver architecture that looks exotic in a lab may be a commodity part in three. The Department of Defense has responded by stacking up faster contracting tools, alternative acquisition pathways, and innovation organizations alongside the classic FAR-based contract. The result is more ways in than ever, and more ways to waste time on the wrong door.
This article walks through the main routes DoD uses to buy EW and spectrum technology, the statutes and regulations behind them, and the practical steps a small business can take to find real requirements and position for them. It sticks to what the statutes, regulations, and official program pages actually say. Where a detail depends on a specific solicitation or agreement, the article says so rather than generalizing.
None of this replaces reading the actual solicitation. Every buying office writes its own terms, and the terms in the document you sign are the ones that matter.
Companies new to defense work often ask which contract vehicle they should use. That question is usually backward. The government picks the vehicle, and it picks it based on what it is trying to do: research a concept, prototype a capability, field a proven product quickly, buy a commercial item, or sustain a program of record. A small business that understands where a requirement sits in that progression can predict which tools the buyer is likely to use and can show up ready for them.
For EW and spectrum work, requirements tend to fall into a few recognizable bands:
Knowing which band an opportunity sits in tells you which rules apply, how fast the award can move, and what the government will expect from you after award.
DoD organizes its acquisition pathways under what it calls the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. Two of those pathways matter most for fast-moving EW and spectrum work: the Middle Tier of Acquisition and the Software Acquisition Pathway.
The Middle Tier of Acquisition, or MTA, exists for capabilities that are mature enough to move quickly. The Defense Acquisition University describes it as a pathway for capabilities that can be "rapidly prototyped within an acquisition program or fielded, within 5 years of MTA program start." Governing policy is DoD Instruction 5000.80.
MTA has two paths:
Both paths have to complete in less than five years from program start. That clock matters to industry. A program office running an MTA effort is under pressure to show results inside a fixed window, which tends to favor mature hardware, clear test plans, and vendors who can deliver on schedule without long development tails.
MTA is a program pathway, not a contract type. An MTA program can use other transactions, FAR-based contracts, or a mix. When you see an EW effort described as an MTA rapid prototyping program, expect speed, prototypes in operators' hands, and a decision point about whether to field.
Congress directed DoD to create software-specific pathways in Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. The resulting Software Acquisition Pathway is meant, in DoD's words, "to facilitate rapid and iterative delivery of software capability to the user."
It has two paths. The applications path covers software running on commercial hardware, modified hardware, and cloud platforms. The embedded software path covers "rapid development, deployment, and insertion of upgrades and improvements to software embedded in weapon systems and other military-unique hardware systems."
The timelines are the point. Programs on this pathway must "demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of capabilities for operational use not later than 1 year after the date on which funds are first obligated." After that, new capabilities are to be delivered "at least annually," with more frequent delivery encouraged.
For EW, this is significant. Much of the value in modern EW systems lives in software: signal detection and classification, threat libraries, techniques, user interfaces, and integration with mission command systems. A company that builds this kind of software should understand that a program on the software pathway is expected to ship working increments on a regular cadence. Proposals that promise a single big delivery years out fit poorly.
Other transactions, usually called OTs or OTAs, are agreements that are not procurement contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements. They are not governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation in the way a standard contract is, which gives the government and industry more room to negotiate terms. They are not unregulated, though. The statutes impose real conditions, and each agreement carries its own negotiated rules.
Section 4021 of Title 10 authorizes the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the military departments to "enter into transactions (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants)" for "basic, applied, and advanced research projects." This authority sits alongside the standard research tools, not in place of them. For EW companies, research OTs tend to show up in early technology work where neither a grant nor a procurement contract fits cleanly.
Section 4022 is the authority most companies mean when they talk about OTs. It allows DARPA, the Defense Innovation Unit, the military departments, and other designated officials to carry out "prototype projects that are directly relevant to enhancing the mission effectiveness of personnel of the Department of Defense or improving platforms, systems, components, or materials proposed to be acquired or developed by the Department of Defense, or to improvement of platforms, systems, components, or materials in use by the armed forces."
The statute's definition of a prototype project is broad. It includes a proof of concept, model, or process (including a business process), reverse engineering to address obsolescence, a pilot or novel application of commercial technologies for defense purposes, agile development activity, and "the creation, design, development, or demonstration of operational utility," or any combination of these. Many EW efforts fit comfortably inside that definition.
There are conditions on when a prototype OT can be used. Under subsection (d), at least one of the following has to be true:
The first two conditions are the reason small businesses and nontraditional companies show up so often in OT teams. A traditional prime that wants to use an OT frequently needs a nontraditional or small business partner doing significant work, or it needs to bring cost share.
The statute also sets approval levels by size. A prototype OT expected to cost more than $100 million but not more than $500 million, including options, requires a written determination by the head of the contracting activity, or by the director of DARPA, DIU, or the Missile Defense Agency. Above $500 million, the senior procurement executive or the relevant agency director has to make written determinations, and the congressional defense committees must be notified in writing at least 30 days before the authority is used. The statute also says that, to the maximum extent practicable, competitive procedures shall be used for prototype agreements.
The provision that makes prototype OTs so attractive is the path to production. Under subsection (f), a prototype OT "may provide for the award of a follow-on production contract or transaction to the participants in the transaction." That follow-on can be awarded without new competitive procedures if two conditions are met: competitive procedures were used to select the parties for the original transaction, and the participants "successfully completed the prototype project."
The statute defines a follow-on production contract or transaction as one "to produce, sustain, or otherwise implement the results of a successfully completed prototype project for continued or expanded use by the Department of Defense." It also clarifies how this works for consortia: a follow-on award is not contingent on completing every activity in a consortium, and an individual prototype or subproject can be the basis for follow-on production once it is successfully completed.
For a small EW company, this is the most important practical fact about OTs. A competitively awarded prototype that succeeds can turn into production without a new full competition. That only works if the original agreement was competed properly and the prototype is documented as successful. Companies should understand, before signing, what "successful completion" means in their agreement and how it will be documented.
OTs are flexible, but they are not invisible. Under subsection (c), agreements that provide for payments above $5 million generally must include a clause giving the Comptroller General the right to examine records, with limited exceptions. Subsection (h) says an OT agreement is treated as a federal agency procurement for purposes of the procurement ethics rules in chapter 21 of Title 41. Companies should keep records as if a GAO auditor may someday read them, because one may.
Many DoD prototype OTs are awarded through consortia. In this model, the government awards a large base agreement to a consortium manager. The consortium's member companies then compete for individual projects issued under that agreement. The statute explicitly recognizes this structure: a transaction includes "all individual prototype subprojects awarded under the transaction to a consortium of United States industry and academic institutions."
For EW and spectrum work, consortia focused on command, control, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are common places where requirements surface. Joining usually involves membership fees and agreement to the consortium's terms. Membership does not guarantee work. It gives access to requests for white papers and solutions, and the chance to compete.
Before paying to join a consortium, a small business should check a few things:
Consortium managers can usually answer these questions. If they cannot or will not, that is useful information too.
A Commercial Solutions Opening, or CSO, is a competitive procedure for buying innovative commercial items. The authority is in 10 U.S.C. 3458, which allows the Secretary of Defense and each military department secretary to "acquire commercial products, commercial services, or nondevelopmental items through a competitive selection of proposals resulting from a general solicitation and a peer review, technical review, or operational review (as appropriate) of such proposals."
A few features of the statute shape how CSOs work in practice:
The general solicitation usually describes a problem or area of interest rather than a detailed specification. Companies respond with short submissions, the government reviews them, and selected companies are invited to provide more detail or full proposals. For companies with a commercial product that addresses a military problem, such as spectrum monitoring hardware, RF test equipment, or commercial counter-drone sensors, a CSO can be a faster and more natural fit than a traditional request for proposals.
The Defense Innovation Unit is one of the best-known users of CSOs and prototype OTs. DIU describes its process in plain steps. A company submits a short solution brief in response to a posted problem. DIU reviews the submissions and invites promising companies to pitch. The government team then works through a competitive, commercial solicitation. DIU says it "leverages Other Transaction authority (10 USC 4022) to award prototype agreements in as few as 60-90 days."
DIU also explains what happens after a successful prototype. It issues what it calls a Success Memo, and it notes that "any competitively awarded prototype-OT contract or agreement may result in the award of a follow-on production contract or agreement without the use of additional competitive procedures." DIU states that the Success Memo has no time restriction and allows any federal agency to procure the solution without re-competition. That last point matters for EW companies whose products could be useful to more than one service.
The services run their own innovation and small business offices. The Air Force uses AFWERX for much of its SBIR and STTR activity, the Navy has NavalX, and the Army has the Army Applications Laboratory. Each runs its own programs, events, and solicitations, and each changes its offerings over time. The practical advice is to check each office's current pages and solicitations directly rather than relying on descriptions that may be out of date.
Innovation offices are useful entry points, but they are not program offices. A successful prototype with an innovation office still needs a transition partner, usually a program office or operational unit with money and a requirement, to become a fielded capability. Companies that ask early who the transition partner is, and what that partner's budget looks like, avoid a lot of disappointment.
The Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs remain among the most important sources of early-stage funding for small defense technology companies. SBA describes the programs as providing non-dilutive funding to develop technology and move it toward commercialization. Each participating agency runs its own program within rules set by Congress and coordinated by SBA.
According to the Congressional Research Service, each agency with an extramural research and development budget above $100 million must allocate at least 3.2 percent of it to SBIR. Each agency with an extramural R&D budget above $1 billion must allocate at least 0.45 percent to STTR. Eleven agencies operate SBIR programs and six operate STTR programs.
The programs run in phases. CRS summarizes them this way: Phase I funds feasibility research, Phase II supports prototype development building on Phase I, and Phase III focuses on commercialization, with no direct SBIR funding but with federal procurement incentives, including sole-source contracting.
SBIR.gov gives typical ranges: Phase I proof-of-concept awards of about 6 to 12 months and $50,000 to $275,000, and Phase II technology development awards of about 24 months and $750,000 to $1.8 million. Agencies can go higher. SBA states that, as of April 2026, agencies may issue a Phase I award up to $323,090 and a Phase II award up to $2,153,927, including modifications, without seeking SBA approval. Larger awards require a waiver.
Phase III is where the programs pay off for defense companies. The statute, 15 U.S.C. 638, defines Phase III work as work that "derives from, extends, or completes efforts made under prior funding agreements" under SBIR or STTR. Phase III work is funded by sources other than the SBIR and STTR set-asides, such as a program office's procurement or RDT&E budget. Because Phase III awards can be made sole source, a company with a relevant SBIR history gives a program office a fast, legally clean way to buy. Program offices value that, and companies should make sure the people they talk to know it.
SBIR and STTR depend on periodic reauthorization by Congress, and that dependence became concrete in 2025. CRS reported that "On September 30, 2025, the statutory authority for these two programs expired." During the lapse, existing awards continued, but agencies stopped issuing new solicitations and suspended selection and funding of new awards.
Congress later acted. According to a summary published by OpenGrants, the Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act (S. 3971) was signed on April 13, 2026, and extends the programs through September 30, 2031. The same summary describes a new Strategic Breakthrough Phase II award of up to $30 million over 48 months with a matching funds requirement, per-firm proposal limits beginning in fiscal year 2027, and expanded screening for foreign risk. Companies should confirm the details against the enacted law and their target agency's current solicitation instructions, since agencies implement these changes on their own timelines.
For EW and spectrum companies, a few habits make SBIR more productive:
Not every EW requirement is a cutting-edge prototype. A large share of DoD's spectrum work is services: engineering support, test and evaluation support, requirements analysis, training development, technical writing, and subject matter expertise. These are usually bought on FAR-based contracts, and small business programs play a big role.
Service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses have their own set-aside and sole-source authorities. Certification moved from the Department of Veterans Affairs to SBA on January 1, 2023, under SBA's Veteran Small Business Certification program, known as VetCert. SBA notes that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 set a December 22, 2024 deadline for veteran firms to be SBA certified for subcontracting and goaling purposes, with a self-certification grace period for firms that applied before the deadline.
The basic eligibility rules for an SDVOSB, as SBA states them, include being a small business under the size standard for the relevant industry and having "no less than 51% of the business owned and controlled by one or more veterans rated as service-disabled by the VA." SBA also states that "The federal government aims to award at least 5% of all federal contracting dollars to SDVOSBs each year."
FAR 19.1405 governs SDVOSB set-asides. A contracting officer "may restrict competition to SDVOSB concerns eligible under the SDVOSB Program if there is a reasonable expectation based on market research that" two or more eligible SDVOSB concerns will submit offers and award will be made at a fair market price. The regulation also says the contracting officer "shall consider SDVOSB set-asides before considering SDVOSB sole source awards (see 19.1406) or small business set-asides (see subpart 19.5)."
That rule of two is why market research responses matter so much. If a contracting officer cannot find at least two capable SDVOSBs, the set-aside does not happen. A capable SDVOSB that ignores a sources sought notice may be the reason a requirement goes to open competition.
FAR 19.1406 allows sole-source awards to SDVOSBs under specific conditions. The contracting officer must not have a reasonable expectation that two or more SDVOSBs will submit offers, the concern must be responsible, and award must be possible at a fair and reasonable price. The anticipated award price, including options, cannot exceed $8.5 million for manufacturing NAICS codes or $5 million for all other NAICS codes. The regulation also ties eligibility to certification: the concern must be designated in SAM as an SBA-certified SDVOSB, or must have represented itself as an SDVOSB in SAM and applied to SBA for certification by December 31, 2023.
For a small SDVOSB with niche EW expertise, the sole-source authority can be a practical way to meet an urgent, narrowly scoped requirement. It is not a way to avoid competition on larger efforts, and the dollar thresholds keep it that way.
By the time a full solicitation appears, much of the shaping is done. The companies that win most often have been talking with the government and responding to market research long before that point.
SAM.gov describes Contract Opportunities as "procurement notices from federal contracting offices," including presolicitation notices, solicitation notices, award notices, and sole source notices. Anyone can search without an account. An account lets a company save searches, follow changes to opportunities, and join interested vendor lists. Data downloads and an API are available for companies that want to automate monitoring.
For EW and spectrum work, saved searches built around the right NAICS codes, product service codes, and keywords pay off quickly. Keywords worth trying include electromagnetic warfare, electronic warfare (still common in older documents and program names), spectrum, signals intelligence, direction finding, counter-UAS, PNT, SATCOM, and the names of specific programs a company follows.
FAR 15.201 encourages exchanges with industry before proposals are received. It lists techniques including "Industry or small business conferences; Public hearings; Market research...One-on-one meetings with potential offerors...Presolicitation notices; Draft RFPs; RFIs; Presolicitation or preproposal conferences; and Site visits."
The regulation is clear about what an RFI is for: "RFIs may be used when the Government does not presently intend to award a contract, but wants to obtain price, delivery, other market information, or capabilities for planning purposes." It is equally clear about the limits: "Responses to these notices are not offers and cannot be accepted by the Government to form a binding contract."
That limit is not a reason to ignore RFIs. It is a reason to answer them well. A good response does four things:
Industry days are worth attending when the requirement fits. They show who else is interested, give a sense of the government's priorities, and sometimes offer one-on-one sessions where a company can ask specific questions. Notes from an industry day are often more useful than the slides.
Solicitations show what the government is buying now. Budget documents show what it plans to buy next. For a company trying to find real EW and spectrum money, the budget justification books are one of the most underused public resources.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) posts budget materials by fiscal year on its website. These include overview documents, the Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System book, the National Defense Budget Estimates (often called the Green Book), and links to component budget documentation for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and defense-wide organizations. Two summary exhibits matter most for finding programs:
A practical workflow looks like this:
Budget books also tell a company whether a promising prototype has anywhere to go. If no program element in future years funds the capability, a successful prototype may have no production path. That is worth knowing before investing heavily in a pursuit.
The books have limits. Classified programs are not described in public documents, and some EW work sits inside larger platform programs where it is not broken out. Program names also change. Still, for unclassified ground, airborne, and maritime EW efforts, the books are a reliable map of where the money is.
Few small businesses win large EW programs alone. Teaming is how most small companies get onto major efforts, build past performance, and gain access to customers.
Primes team with small businesses for several reasons that a small company can use in negotiations. The prototype OT statute makes significant small business or nontraditional participation one of the conditions for using an OT. Small business subcontracting goals and plans apply to many large contracts. And small companies often bring niche technical skills, such as a specific signal processing technique, antenna design, or operational EW experience, that a large company lacks in-house.
A strong teaming arrangement has a few common traits:
Small businesses can also team with each other. Joint ventures and teaming between small businesses, including SDVOSBs, can let a group of small companies compete for work that none could win alone, while keeping the work inside small business set-asides. The specific rules for joint ventures depend on the program and on SBA regulations, so companies should get qualified advice before forming one.
A few mistakes come up repeatedly with companies new to DoD EW work.
DoD has more ways to buy EW and spectrum technology than ever. Prototype OTs under 10 U.S.C. 4022 offer speed and a statutory path to follow-on production. CSOs under 10 U.S.C. 3458 offer a competitive, fixed-price route for commercial and nondevelopmental items. The Middle Tier of Acquisition and the Software Acquisition Pathway give program offices faster structures for prototypes, fielding, and software. SBIR and STTR, now reauthorized after a lapse that began on September 30, 2025, remain the classic entry point for small technology companies, with Phase III as the bridge to production. SDVOSB set-asides and sole-source authorities give qualified veteran-owned firms specific tools, bounded by the rule of two and clear dollar thresholds.
The companies that do best with these tools do the same basic things. They know where a requirement sits on the path from research to production. They read the statutes and solicitations instead of relying on summaries. They answer market research. They use the budget books to follow the money. And they build relationships with the program offices and units that will ultimately decide whether a capability gets fielded.
The vehicle matters, but the requirement and the money behind it matter more.

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